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0:00:21 
Minh   
 
Hello sir. I'm honoured and glad to have the chance to discuss with you today the fight 
against the French invasion, from your experience of twenty years in the military, and fifty-
two years being a diplomat, a writer, and a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of 
Vietnam. I'll start by asking you, what were the ideas you had at the age of seventeen to 
eighteen, when you joined the Viet Minh? 
 
0:00:52 
Huynh 
 
I came from a poor family, in the countryside, but I was lucky. Because I was good at school, 
I was sent to Hue to study, with a scholarship from the French government back then. I was 
from a poor family, but my father was educated, knowledgeable. So, from very young, I had 
the spirit of patriotism instilled in me, very young. When I was studying in Hue National 
School, I asked my close friends to come together and write articles about patriotism, under 
the reign of colonialism. Very young, and those articles were secret, secretly passed on 
among students. From a very young age, I was aware of national independence, patriotism, 
freedom for the people, from a very young age. Why did I participate so early? It was 
because of the patriotic spirit that had been fostered in me since school-going age. In 
particular, when I was in school, I had a teacher. His name was Doan Nong. He joined the 
revolution, with me later on. He also taught me about patriotism, and he helped me with 
writing patriotic articles from the early years. I started writing the articles when I was only 
sixteen. 
 
Once the Viet Minh came to my hometown, I managed to contact friends, who also had the 
intention to join the Viet Minh, and I joined the Viet Minh from the early days. The exact 
time I joined was February or March 1945. I quit school and quit vocational training to join 
Viet Minh. I was assigned to be the assistant to a revolutionary leader. He was the president 
of the district's Viet Minh Front, the revolutionary organisation of the district, and also the 
president of the province's revolutionary organisation.  I became his assistant at an early 
age; still in my teens. That was my most vivid memory of participating in the revolution. I 
wasn't a Communist party member then. I was a Viet Minh, I was in the Viet Minh. 
Afterwards, when I was learning the rules in the army, that was when I joined the 
Communist party, September 1946. I am about to receive a medal for having served 
seventy years in the Party. Actually, I joined the revolution some eighty years ago now. 
 
When Uncle Ho declared independence, I was at home in Quang Tri province, being the 
province president's assistant. I had to find a way to listen to the declaration in Hanoi. I ran 
across the town of Quang Tri, to ask if anyone had a radio. In the whole town of thousands 
of residents, there was only one radio, only one, and I found it. I found the radio to connect 
to the capital city. Luckily, I managed to tune in. That was the first achievement, the first 
contribution to disseminate the Declaration of Independence, from Hanoi to Quang Tri. 
Nowadays radios are everywhere, but back then, a radio was rare to find, and very 
valuable. So, it was the hand of fate that brought me to it. I was so happy. For a normal 
citizen to understand ‒ one must be in that situation to understand ‒ the situation of 
oppressive exploitation imposed on us. Everywhere we went, we were beaten by the 
French, and were called "cyclo". They called us "cyclo" (pedal-taxi driver). Only such 
sentiments could make one comprehend how precious independence was. Invaluable. At 
that time, that was why thousands of young men and women were willing to sacrifice their 
lives to fight against the French. They were willing to fight for independence, for freedom. 
Nothing is more precious than that. That was the first period, the first emotions when I 
heard the Declaration of Independence. After the Declaration, I immediately thought, "What 
to do now? Now that we're independent, what am I to do?" My first idea was to fight the 
enemy.  
 
0:05:30 
Minh 
 
Let's talk about leadership, at any age, at any level of management. In your view, when you 
joined the army, when you joined the Viet Minh, at the age of seventeen, eighteen, when 
you joined the army, how did you view leadership, when you were eighteen, when you 
were twenty?  
 
0:06:00 
Huynh 
 
It's strange. Leadership is a broad concept. I have read articles about different types of 
leadership. Each profession, a different type of leadership. When you teach, it's a different 
kind of leadership. When you are a soldier, it's a different kind of leadership.  
 
Leadership, first and foremost, is our thinking, our mind. So, leadership, when I was in the 
army was finding out how to be good in the military - how to work, how to fight in the best 
way. That was my first thought when I was among other military folks. For twenty years 
that was my thinking, for twenty years when I was a soldier. 
 
0:06:47 
Minh 
 
Knowing that the Vietnamese army was not as strong as the French army at that time, how 
did that leadership mindset help you in realising that it would be a long-term fight, with a 
much strong opponent? 
 
0:07:18 
Huynh 
 
I immediately saw that it would be difficult. Apparently, the French were stronger than us. 
Not just stronger but overwhelming us. They were stronger by a thousand times, not by a 
hundred times. We had no big guns, no tanks, no artillery. Yet they used aircraft, battleships 
and tanks against us. We had nothing. So, I knew right then, it would be difficult, arduous. 
Because I had the thinking, from the start, I was aware that the fight would be long and 
hard. So, the leadership idea, the awareness at that time was to see that everything would 
be tough, and it would take a long time. The mindset of the leaders, and of myself, through 
all those ten years, was that it would be a long grueling fight. That was always in our mind, 
in our leadership thinking. 
 
0:08:20 
Minh 
 
When the battle of Dien Bien Phu began, when you... when the Vietnamese army started 
facing the French army in Dien Bien Phu, after fighting for fifty-six days, after three months, 
or more, what were your thoughts when the French surrendered? Did you think that day 
would come for Hanoi, for Vietnam? 
 
0:08:53 
Huynh 
 
We had a characteristic in Vietnamese army, in the fight with the French, and later with the 
Americans. When we were fighting, we all knew that we would win. Definitely would win, 
albeit all the hardships. At the time we couldn't know it would take ten years, or fifteen 
years. We didn't think about that. We just knew for sure that it would take a long time. A 
long fight, but definitely a victorious fight.  So, when our army organised for the battle of 
Dien Bien Phu, all my brothers in the General Staff Office, as well as all other brothers that I 
met, even normal soldiers and normal people, we all knew that our attack at Dien Bien Phu 
would definitely be a win. Even though the French had challenged us to attack. "Challenge 
however you want, and you'll see one day, you'll see how your challenge is nothing."  
 
In my mind, although I didn't personally fight at Dien Bien Phu, considering the overall 
situation, the concentration of our forces there, I thought that we were determined to win, 
and we were going to win. There was no other outcome. The soldiers who came to 
surround Dien Bien Phu, the workers who transported cartridges and rice uphill to Dien 
Bien Phu, they all knew we would win. That's why they were willing to sacrifice their lives. 
When you don't want to win, when you don't see that you can win, you won't sacrifice 
everything. You will hesitate. But here, they were determined, because they were certain 
about victory. That was certain, and I myself also had the thought that victory was certain.  
 
0:10:27 
Minh 
 
You joined the delegation to negotiate in Paris with the Americans, in the late 1960s. What 
was your thought when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose you as a member of the 
delegation? What leadership thinking do you think they based their selection on?  
 
0:10:52 
Huynh 
 
Our army opened fire in Saigon. The first day of Lunar New Year. Thousands of people in 
the North were excited about the news of the fight in Saigon. In the morning of the next day, 
I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh convened 
the four of us and said, "You should prepare. It's about time to start negotiations."  I stuck 
with the Paris Negotiation for more than ten years, more than ten years for the 
negotiations. From the start of the negotiation to the end, to the completion of the book, I 
lost ten years.  
 
Fighting the Americans was a big task, very big, very difficult. On the battlefield, at the 
negotiation table, and on the international front. Difficult, why? Vietnam was a weak and 
poor country. The country was split, with only the North being free. Our arsenal was 
humble, our force weak, without aircraft, without tanks, without battleships. We negotiated 
with the Americans. You should know that the US (United States) had a very powerful 
diplomatic system. They had hundreds of ambassadors, professionally trained, very good 
ambassadors. Meanwhile, our own diplomacy had just been established, and we had to 
confront the American diplomacy. Our army had to confront the vigorous American forces. 
So, it was extremely difficult. At the beginning of the negotiation, we already knew it would 
be difficult.  
 
Let me give you some examples. The first thing we requested from the US was that the US 
should not enter the South. The South was ours. The South belonged to the people of South 
Vietnam. The North was ours. Why did you come and bomb our North? So, starting the 
negotiation, the first thing we did was to request two things: First, the US army must stop 
bombing the North. Second, they must withdraw from the South. 
 
0:13:10 
Minh 
 
Unconditionally? 
 
0:13:12 
Huynh 
 
Unconditionally. Our two requests were reasonable. Bombing our country, an independent 
country. Why did you come to bomb us out of nowhere? Was anyone bombing the US at all? 
Yet you came bombing us. You must withdraw your army from the South. You must stop 
bombing the North. Without any reason, you sent troops to the South of Vietnam, you 
invaded the South of Vietnam. That was how we argued, we pointed out what was right for 
us, to inundate them.  
 
However, there was no way they would listen to what we said, nor would they agree. They 
said, "Yes, now you are aiding the Viet Cong in the South. Now if you stop the supply, we 
will stop bombing the North." 
 
As for the second request for the US to withdraw their army from the South, what did they 
ask for in return? The US said, "Now, the US troops entering the South. Yes, they were 
outside forces, so it was not acceptable. But then your Northern troops entering the South 
were also outside forces. So, the two outside forces should both withdraw. The US army 
should withdraw, the Northern army should also withdraw. That's fair, isn't it?" That's fair, 
the American way. So, what to do now? We kept on arguing, day after day. You withdraw, I 
withdraw. You don't withdraw, I don't withdraw. So on and so forth, we kept on arguing.  
 
In the end, I proposed that, Nguyen Khac Huynh proposed that, we should make a case for a 
civil war in the South. The Americans had no reason not to withdraw. Regarding the 
Northern forces involved in the South, it was a Vietnamese force. So, the way in which 
Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam would resolve the conflict should be left for those 
forces to decide. The conflict between Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, in general, all 
forces in the South, including the Northern army, would be resolved by Vietnamese parties, 
and the US would have no say in that. They should not get involved in that because the US 
was an outsider, outside force. Vietnamese forces in the South would resolve the conflict on 
their own.  
 
That claim was a tactical success that swayed the US to stop insisting our force withdraw. 
That was the business of Vietnamese parties only. Yes, the purpose of our claim was to 
refute the argument that both sides had to withdraw. Very well done, and the world had to 
acknowledge that we had a very strong argument. The division issue, the Vietnamese army 
issue, the Vietnamese army and the people, will be left for the Vietnamese to resolve. So 
that was how we argued.  
 
Eventually, the US saw that they couldn't hold on any longer. They had to withdraw and 
accept our line. But they changed one thing, "The two Vietnamese armed forces in the 
South of Vietnam are to resolve the conflict on their own”, meaning it was between the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), or the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government (PRG) to be exact, and Saigon, without any involvement of the US. So, we were 
successful in swaying the US to withdraw their involvement in Vietnam's affairs. They had 
to acquiesce to the Vietnamese army staying, the Northern Vietnamese army, staying in the 
South. That was a great diplomatic success for us. We were very weak, and yet we managed 
to keep our troops in the South, while the Americans had to leave. That was the greatest 
success in the initial process of diplomatic negotiations.  
 
0:16:54 
Minh 
 
As far as I understand, you had a long time, twenty years in the artillery, twenty-two years 
in the military. 
 
0:17:07 
Huynh 
 
Military. 
 
0:17:08 
Minh 
 
Diplomacy... and your time as a lecturer, a teacher. Through the three settings, what did you 
think about leadership during each period, and what were the areas that required 
leadership during each period? 
 
0:17:32 
Huynh 
 
Whether in military, in diplomacy, or in education, proper leadership is always a must, as 
everyone relies on the leaders as guides. Leadership includes these factors: First, to have a 
proper evaluation of the circumstances. When fighting the French, we evaluated their 
strengths, as well as their weaknesses. The Americans also had their own strengths and 
weaknesses. We must be able to see those. When we see the enemy's strengths and 
weaknesses, we see our advantages and disadvantages. That's evaluating the 
circumstances.  
 
Second, to have a proper policy. That's very important. The second factor of leadership is 
proper policies. If Vietnam had followed a "short-term war" policy, fighting to win battles, 
we could have lost to the US. We had to make it a "long-term war", so that the American 
troops got tired and the American people started protesting, making the enemy weaker. 
That's why Vietnam's fight against the US had to be so long.  
 
Third, the third factor of leadership is techniques and methods. Having a proper policy is 
one thing, but proper policies cannot create forces themselves. There had to be methods to 
implement the policy. How to mobilise people? How to mobilise forces? In any discipline, 
there are forces working. In education, we also need a force. In military, we also need a 
force. How to organise the forces to achieve our goal? So, there are three factors. First, 
proper evaluation of circumstances. Second, proper policies. Third, the force to ensure 
implementation, action.  
 
0:19:15 
Minh  
 
When you talk about mobilisation of the people by leadership, do you think that sometimes 
we know, we grasp the situation, but sometimes we don't, sometimes our confidence is not 
as strong as other times. In times that we lacked confidence, we didn't understand, or 
didn't firmly grasp the situation, how did we mobilise the people? 
 
0:19:46 
Huynh 
 
All of that happens in life. That's the art of leadership. Mobilising the people, it's an art. 
What art is in that? When you intend something, when you calculate for something to 
happen, you must have three options. They called me Mr "Three-option Huynh". Why, 
because when somebody asks me a question, I'll reply "There are three options." What are 
the three options? The first option, the best option, is calculating so as to meet the highest 
requirements. If we can't get the best option, we'll try to get the medium option. And the 
minimum option is the last that we opt for. It's still favourable for us, but at the minimal 
level possible. Three options. 
 
For instance, we requested the Americans to withdraw. After the negotiation they agreed to 
withdraw, let's see how long it would take them to do so. We wanted them to leave as fast 
as possible, within ten days to a month. We proposed that option, that the US army would 
leave within ten to fifteen days, to thirty days, a month. We knew that they wouldn't agree 
to that. Tens of thousands of soldiers could not possibly withdraw in a month. So then we 
proposed two months, or sixty days. We also prepared for the option of three months, or 
ninety days, within which the American troops would be gone. We kept fighting for the 
one-month option first, to no avail. Then Mr Le Duc Tho said, "Alright, considering your 
situation, we would provide you with our support. We would clear the roads, and make 
more roads, and we would give orders to our forces in the South to stop fighting with the 
Americans, so your troops can withdraw conveniently."  
 
Eventually we agreed on the sixty-day option. In the Accords, it was stated that withdrawal 
was to be complete within sixty days. They did accordingly, exactly sixty days after the date 
of signing. So that was the second option. We didn't use the third option. That's the way to 
calculate, because you don't always get what you want.  
 
0:21:53 
Minh 
 
If I take it from there and look forward to the future, regarding the issue, the aspect of 
leadership, then how could we know who is the real friend, and who is the real enemy?  
 
0:21:12 
Huynh 
 
A very smart question, and difficult to answer. Now, is the US still an enemy of Vietnam? Is 
France still an enemy of Vietnam? Who is the enemy of Vietnam? It's very difficult, very 
difficult. But it requires our leaders to be able to differentiate, to calculate, to consider 
possibilities. Whether to be outspoken about that or not is one thing, but in the minds of 
our leaders, they have to know. Even if they don't talk about that, "You're my enemy, but I 
don't necessarily declare it". Behave, to find an appropriate way to behave toward whoever 
that is possibly harmful to our independence and sovereignty.  
 
The leader must have I mentioned three attributes: first, a grasp of the situation; second, a 
proper policy; three, methods to implement that policy. So, the first one is to analyse, to 
grasp the situation means to analyse. Analyse what is going to happen next? The leader 
must be able to see what is going to happen. What possibilities, and among the possibilities, 
what is the worst-case scenario. All of that needs analysis. A leader that doesn't know how 
to calculate for possibilities is a bad leader. A good leader knows how to calculate and 
analyse which possibilities are likely to happen. And when it happens, how to react. [thế 
nào đây] 
 
0:23:48 
Minh 
 
So that's the kind of leadership that you want in the future, and in the present, for Vietnam? 
 
0:23:54 
Huynh 
 
In the present, in the future, forever, it must always be like that. We have to calculate for 
five years, ten years in the future. If we only look at one or two years in the future, it won't 
do. We must calculate for longer term.  
 
0:24:10 
Minh 
 
If you had a brief or advice for young leaders in the future, or advice for your children, in 
terms of leadership, what would you say to them? 
 
0:24:34 
Huynh 
 
I am just a normal official. I don't dare advise anyone, nor lecture anyone. I just want to 
express my wish that the leader be someone who, first, can stay current. Catch up with the 
current issues. Time has changed, the world has progressed, don't hold on to old things. 
Catch up with the current events. A leader who doesn't stay current will lag behind very 
soon, lag behind.  
 
Second, the leader is someone, who is able to predict all possibilities. Short-term, medium-
term, and long-term possibilities. Evaluate all possibilities. This year, the economy has been 
improving, good harvests, but still we have to look at the possibilities of poor harvests, or 
the economy going south, or oil prices increasing, then what are we to do? All the 
possibilities must be considered and analysed, including the worst-case scenarios. 
Whoever is good at assessing, and analysing is the winner. They must have foresight. The 
leader must have a vision.  
 
I'm not lecturing any leader here. But here is my wish. Leaders must stay current. The 
world has moved on, we must also move on. Don't hold on to things that we tried to pursue 
thirty or forty years ago. The circumstances have changed now. Second, assess the 
possibilities in the short term, medium term, and long term. Assess thoroughly, do things to 
the end. 
 
0:26:14 
Minh 
 
I sincerely thank you for sharing your experiences with us, as well as with our future 
generations. Thank you very much. 
 
0:26:24 
Huynh 
 
Alright, I also thank you, Minh, for organising this meeting. I wish all of your success. You all 
have worked hard.  
 
0:26:33 
Minh 
 
Thank you.  
